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COMMON-LAW FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE JUDICIALLY ABOLISHED
IN MICHIGAN
People v Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980)
In People n Aaron,' the Michigan Supreme Court judicially abol-
ished 2 the common-law felony murder doctrine,3 finding the doctrine
in violation of the basic criminal law principle of individual
culpability.4
Defendant, Stephen Aaron, and an accomplice took jewelry and
money from their intended victim's apartment while awaiting his re-
turn.5 When the victim returned they shot and killed him.6 The Re-
corder's Court of Detroit convicted Aaron of first degree felony murder
and the court of appeals affirmed. 7 The Michigan Supreme Court first
remanded the case for resentencing and then granted Aaron's applica-
tion for reconsideration. The question on reconsideration was whether
the court could reduce the defendant's conviction of first-degree mur-
der to second-degree murders because the trial court only instructed the
jury on felony murder.9 Upon review of Aaron and two other felony
1. 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
2. Michigan is the first state to abolish the felony murder rule judicially. A Michigan statute
does, however, mandate the application of the felony murder doctrine in some instances. MICH.
Cotp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.316, .317 (Cum. Supp. 1980). State legislatures have abolished the fel-
ony murder rule in Kentucky, Hawaii, and Ohio. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
3. The felony murder doctrine finds all participants of a felony guilty of murder for deaths
occurring during the perpetration of the felony. Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony Murder
Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 192.
4. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.1, comment I (Proposed Official Draft 1962); R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 37-45 (2d ed. 1969); Morris, The Felon's Responsibililyfor the LethalActs
of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 59-61 (1956).
5. The court of appeals stated that the defendant went to the victim's apartment and ex-
pressed his intention to kill him. People v. Aaron, 63 Mich. App. 230, 231, 234 N.W.2d 462, 463
(1975). The trial court, however, convicted the defendant of "first degree felony murder as a result
of a homicide committed during the perpetration of an armed robbery." 409 Mich. at 688, 299
N.W.2d at 307. It is unclear why the prosecution relied on the felony murder doctrine to obtain a
first-degree murder conviction when there was an intent to kill.
6. See 63 Mich. App. 230, 230-31, 234 N.W.2d 462, 462-63 (1975).
7. Id.
8. The authors of the Model Penal Code distinguish the various degrees of homicide on the
basis of the individual's state of mind. First-degree murder is "knowingly committed." Second-
degree murder is recklessly committed. Manslaughter may be accidentally committed. MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 201.1, comment 4, at 39 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1962). See also People v. Carter,
387 Mich. 397, 197 N.W.2d 57 (1972); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
9. 409 Mich. at 689, 299 N.W.2d at 307. The trial court denied Aaron's motion for an
instruction on lesser-degree murder and manslaughter offenses.
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murder cases I0 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed Aaron" and
held: The common-law felony murder doctrine, by substituting the in-
tent to commit a felony with the malice aforethought required for first-
degree murder,'2 violates the basic principle of criminal law that bases
liability on individual culpability 3 and is therefore abolished in the
State of Michigan. 14
Sir Edward Coke first derived the felony murder doctrine in Lord
Dacres' Case'5 and Mansell and Herbert's Case'6 from the common-
10. The companion cases were People v. Thompson, 81 Mich. App. 348, 265 N.W,2d 632
(1978), af'd, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980) and People v. Wright, 80 Mich. App. 172, 262
N.W.2d 917 (1977), afd, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
In Thompson, the Saginaw County Circuit Court convicted the defendant of armed robbery and
first-degree murder. 402 Mich. 938 (1978). The court of appeals reversed both convictions and
remanded, and the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. 81 Mich. App. 348, 265
N.W.2d 632 (1978), leave to appealgranted, 402 Mich. 938 (1978).
In Wright the Washtenaw County Circuit Court convicted the defendant on two counts of first
degree murder for two deaths resulting from a fire which the defendant had set. 402 Mich. 938
(1978). The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, requiring an instruction on malice,
and a separate finding of malice from the intent to commit the underlying felony. 80 Mich. App.
172, 262 N.W.2d 917 (1977), leave to appeal granted, 402 Mich. 938 (1978).
In both Thompson and Wright the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to answer
the narrow question of whether the court of appeals erroneously reversed the murder convictions
"because of the lack of an instruction on a requirement for finding malice in a felony murder
situation." 409 Mich. at 689, 299 N.W.2d at 307.
II. In Aaron the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court. In
Thompson and Wright the court affirmed the court of appeals' decisions and remanded both cases
to the trial courts. 409 Mich. at 734, 299 N.W.2d at 329.
12. "Malice aforethought is the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder from other
killing." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *192, 198. The common law defined malice afore-
thought as the intent to kill, the intent to commit serious bodily injury, or a wanton and willful
disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a person's behavior is to cause death or
serious bodily harm. See R. PERKINS, supra note 4, at 37.
13. See generally sources cited supra note 4.
14. 409 Mich. at 733, 299 N.W.2d at 328.
15. 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535).
16. 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1558).
In LordDacres'Case, Lord Dacres and his companions were unlawfully hunting in a park. The
participants had previously agreed to kill anyone who tried to stop them. One of Lord Dacres'
companions killed a gamekeeper. Lord Dacres was convicted of murder under a theory of con-
structive presence even though he was not present at the killing. See 409 Mich. at 690, 299
N.W.2d at 308-09.
In Mansell andHerbert's Case, Herbert and more than forty followers went to rob Sir Richard
Mansfield. One of Herbert's servants threw a stone, intending to strike someone guarding Mans-
field's dwelling. Instead, the stone struck and killed an unarmed woman emerging from the
house. The court convicted Herbert of murder for the servant's act. See 409 Mich. at 691, 299
N.W.2d at 308.
Some commentators suggest that Lord.Dacres' Case turned upon the felons' actual intent to kill
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law theory of constructive malice 7 by implying the intent to commit
murder from underlying felonious acts. Crown courts strictly applied
the rule"s in a few subsequent cases,19 but gradually modified and lim-
ited its application until Parliament abolished it in 1957. 20
Several English courts, pursuant to the felony murder rule, required
a deliberate unlawful act to impute the requisite malice for murder or
required that the act evidence an intent to inflict personal violence.21
whomever might resist their unlawful adventure. See, e.g., Kaye, The Early History of Murder and
Manslaughter. Part 11, 83 L.Q. REV., 569, 578-79, 593 (1967); Note, Felony Murder as a First
Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 430-31 n.23 (1957); 59 DICK. L.
REV. 183, 185 (1955). Another commentator distinguishes Mansell & Herbert's Case from other
felony murder cases because it involved a deliberate act of violence. See Moessel, A Survey of
Felon, Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453 (1955). Nevertheless, the following statement of the felony
murder rule by Lord Coke is most often cited, along with Lord Dacres' and Mansell and Herbert's
Case, as the origin of the felony murder rule:
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to steale a deere in the park of B.,
shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush:
this is murder, for that the act was unlawfull, although A. had no intent to hurt the boy,
nor knew not of him. But if B. the owner of the park had shot at his own deer, and
without any ill intent had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been homi-
cide by misadventure, and no felony.
So if one shoot at any wild fowle upon a tree, and the arrow killeth any reasonable
creature afar off, without any evill intent in him, this isper infortunium [misadventure]:
for it was not unlawful to shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a cock or hen, or
any tame fowle of another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killed a man, this had
been murder, for the act was unlawfull.
3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *56 (1797), quoted in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 692, 299 N.W.2d
304, 309 (1980).
17. Sir Edward Coke used the constructive malice doctrine to equate the intent to commit the
underlying felonious act with the malice required for murder, even if the resultant death was
accidental. 3 E. COKE, supra note 16, at *56. See J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 88(3) (1934); D.
STROUD, MENS REA 169-70 (1914).
18. The common-law theory of constructive malice finds malice or the intent to kill where
there is no actual intent to kill. For instance, the intent to commit a crime that might result in
violence may, under the constructive malice theory, result in a murder conviction because the
courts will imply malice even if the death was accidental. 3 E.COKE, supra note 16, at *5-6. Thus,
actual intent to kill is unnecessary for a felony murder conviction. J. MILLER, supra note 17, at
§ 88(3): D. STROUD, supra note 17, at 169-170.
19. See, e.g., Regina v. Holland, 174 Eng. Rep. 313 (1841) (if defendant's act ultimately re-
sults in death, defendant is guilty even though the actual cause of death was victim's refusal to
accept proper medical treatment); Sir Charles Stanley's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1663) (if a man
joins in an unlawful act, even without knowledge of its unlawfulness, he is guilty of all that fol-
lows from the act).
20. Section one of England's Homicide Act, which abolished the felony murder rule, requires
that a killing be with malice aforethought, express or implied, before finding the defendant guilty
of murder. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1 (1957). See generally Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A
New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 635 (1957).
21. See. e.g., Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1106 (K.B. 1701) (felon not liable for
killing of cofelon by law enforcement officer); Rex v. Keate, 90 Eng. Rep. 557, 558 (K.B. 1697)
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Some courts insisted that the felonious act be malum in se,2 2 or that the
killing be in furtherance of a felonious purpose.2 3 In Regina v. Serne,24
Justice Stephens limited the felony murder rule to cases in which the
unlawful act created a substantial and foreseeable risk of human in-
jury. In Regina v. Greenwood,25 the court further modified the rule by
requiring an instruction on the lesser included offenses of felony
murder.26
State legislatures and courts in the United States have substantially
limited and modified the common-law felony murder rule.27 A few ju-
risdictions, nevertheless, have applied the rule harshly,28 and some
(employer stabbed gardener for refusing to return some keys; not murder unless deliberate unlaw-
ful act done with intent to injure).
22. An act is malum in se if it is inherently evil in nature and consequence. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979). See generally 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF TH-E ENGLISH LAW
255 (1926); R. PERKINS, supra note 4.
23. King v. Borthwick, 99 Eng. Rep. 136, 138-39 (1779) (no murder when bystander killed
during fight between defendant and others because identity of actual killer unknown and no proof
that all prisoners were of "same pursuit"). See also MacKalley's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 67b (1612);
Mansell and Herbert's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1558); C. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 255 (1926); R. PERKINS, supra note 4.
24. 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887) (felony murder charge for death of a son from fire allegedly set by
defendant). See also Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox C.C. 635 (1911); Regina v. Whitemarsh, 62 Just. 711
(1898); Regina v. Towers, 12 Cox C.C. 530 (1874); Queen v. McIntyre, 2 Cox C.C. 379 (1847). C.
Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129 (1862) (court allowed jury to find for defendant if victim
could have been intervening cause in own death by entering barn after defendant set barn on fire).
25. 7 Cox C.C. 404 (1857).
26. In Greenwood, the court allowed the jury to reach a manslaughter verdict when the de-
fendant had raped a child who subsequently died from venereal disease contracted during the
rape. See 409 Mich. at 697 n.43, 299 N.W.2d at 311 n.43.
27. See generally Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L.
249 (1976); Crum, supra note 3; Moessel, supra note 16; Note, Felony Murder Rule-ln Search 0/a
Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Felony Murder Rule].
28. In Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941), and in Commonwealth v.
Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 A. 24 (1922), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that any homicide
committed during the perpetration of a felony is murder, even if the killing is involuntary or
unintentional.
Some cases have held that any killing committed during the res gestae of a felony is automati-
cally murder under the felony murder rule. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632
(1936) (attempted burglary); People v. Smith, 187 N.Y.S. 836 (burglary), rey'd, 232 N.Y. 239, 133
N.E. 574 (1921). See also Evans v. State, 109 Ala. 11, 19 So. 535 (1896) (felon responsible for
killing done by cofelon, regardless of intent); State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879 (1967)
(unintentional killing committed while defendant is in felonious possession of a pistol is first-
degree murder); State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226, 243 P. 291 (1926) (words "any murder" in statute
mean any killing); State v. Roselli, 109 Kan. 33, 198 P. 195 (1921) (felon satisfies statutory
equivalents of deliberation and premeditation for first-degree murder by perpetrating one of enu-
merated felonies).
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states continue to classify a homicide committed during any felony as
first-degree murder.29 Most states, however, now apply the felony mur-
der rule only when a homicide occurs during specifically enumerated
felonies." Furthermore, the rule's application is limited by restrictions
concerning the act, 3' the actor,3 2 the victim,3 3 the underlying felony,34
and the defendant's mental state.
The act requirements focus on the time element and the causal rela-
tion between the felony and the homicide. Several states insist that the
homicide occur in the course of the felony, sometimes including acts
done immediately before the commission of the felony and acts done
while the felons are fleeing the scene of the crime.36 Other jurisdictions
construe the res gestae of the crime more narrowly,37 or leave the tim-
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1980 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1974); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2-1 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit.
21, §§ 701.1, .2 (West Supp. 1980) (homicide committed during felony other than those enumer-
ated is murder in second degree); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (homicide
committed during any felony is murder in second degree).
30. Robbery triggers the felony murder rule in 36 states; burglary in 33 states; arson in 32
states; rape in 31 states; kidnapping in 26 states; escape in 12 states.
California, Idaho and Maryland apply the rule for mayhem. Michigan and Tennessee include
larceny. Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Utah, and Virginia include sodomy. Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Nevada, and Oklahoma specify sexual molestation of a child. Eleven states
include other sexual offenses: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Dakota. Pennsylvania, and Utah.
Arkansas, Florida, Nebraska, and Tennessee apply the felony murder doctrine to aircraft
piracy. California, Florida, and Tennessee apply the rule when the defendant uses bombing and
destructive devices. Maryland applies the doctrine for housebreaking; Michigan does so for
extortion.
31. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text..
33, Id.
34. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
35. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 563 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 371 P.2d 786 (1962) (defendant shot victim
while fleeing from robbery); People v. Goree, 30 Mich. App. 490, 186 N.W.2d 872 (1971) (police-
man killed while felons fleeing from scene of crime); MacAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d
45, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 804 (1944) (death of victim after forcible rape); State v. Fouquette, 67
Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950) (took loot away within res gestae of crime); Commonwealth v.
Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 A. 313 (1926) (policeman killed by cofelon during attempt to flee from
crime).
In State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W. 632 (1936), the court held that when the initial crime
and the homicide are part of a continuous transaction and closely related in time, place, and
causal relation, the homicide is within the res gestae of the felony.
37. See, e.g., State v. Opher, 38 Del. 93, 188 A. 257 (1936) (shooting rape victim after rape
complete not within res gestae of underlying felony); People v. Smith, 55 Mich. App. 184, 222
N.W.2d 172 (1974) (killing of robbery victim after defendant had escaped from scene of crime not
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ing question for the jury.38 Some states prescribe that the felon's acts
must be the proximate cause of the homicide, 39 setting in motion the
entire chain of events leading to the death.40 Other jurisdictions re-
quire that the homicide result from an act conmitted in furtherance of
the felonious enterprise.4
within res gestae of robbery), aff'd inpart, 396 Mich. 825 (1976); Huggins v. State, 149 Miss. 280,
115 S. 213 (1928) (prosecution must prove that felons agreed to kill anyone standing in way at any
time during commission of underlying felony to find felony murder); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y.
140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933) (killing of victim during escape attempt after abandoning loot not first-
degree felony murder without proof of deliberation and intent); People v. Hater, 184 N.Y. 237, 77
N.E. 6 (1906) (killing of policeman chasing defendant after unsuccessful burglary attempt not
within res gestae of attempted burglary); People v. Joyner, 32 App. Div.2d 260, 301 N.Y.S.2d 215
(1969) (killing of victim before formation of intent to rob not felony murder), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d
106, 257 N.E.2d 26, 308 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1970); State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68, 277 P. 394 (1929)
(killing of victim while attempting to return stolen automobile not within res gestae of theft); State
v. Golladay, 78 Wash. 2d 121, 470 P.2d 191 (1970) (killing of victim after rape and larceny com-
pleted not within res gestae of crime). See also People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535
(1919); Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the New York
Statutes, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 288 (1934); Cadmus, The Beginning and End of ,4ttenpt and Felonies
Under the Statutory Felony Murder Doctrine, 51 DIcK. L. REV. 12 (1946); Corcoran, Felony Mur-
der in New York, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 43 (1937).
38. See, e.g., People v. Sirgnano, 42 Cal. App. 3d 794, 117 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1974); People v.
Smith, 55 Mich. App. 184, 222 N.W.2d 172 (1974), af'd in part, 396 Mich. 825, 238 N.W.2d 536
(1976); People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440, 231 N.E.2d 722, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 391 U.S.
928 (1967). See generally Adlerstein, supra note 27; Crum, supra note 3; Moessel, supra note 16.
39. See Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 516-17, 113 A.2d 464, 473 (1955) (defendant's
felonious act not probable cause of cofelon's death when cofelon's act of setting fire was interven-
ing force between defendant's actions and accomplice's death). See also People v. Harrison, 176
Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959); People v. Graves, 52 Mich. App. 326, 217 N.W.2d 78
(1974); Commonwealth v. Aimeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949); Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939). See
generally Adlerstein, supra note 27; Crum, supra note 3; Moessel, supra note 16; 17 FORDHAM L.
REV. 124 (1948); 22 TULANE L. REV. 325 (1947).
40. Some states require that the felon cause the death for a first-degree murder conviction.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501 to -1505 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, :31 (West 1974);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp.
1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. 163.115 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.32.030 to 9A.45 (Supp. 1981). See also State v. Canola, 135 N.J. Super 224, 343 A.2d
110 (1975).
41. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501 to -1505 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (Cum.
Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54C (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635-636 (Cum.
Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, :31 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West
1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1976);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1979); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030 to .045 (Supp. 1981). See also People v. Podolski, 332
Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952) (defendant guilty of felony murder for starting fight which re-
sulted in victim's death); People v. Ryan, 263 N.Y. 298, 189 N.E. 225, (1934) (acts done between
period of 225, (1934) (acts done between period of inception of attempt to commit felony and
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The underlying felony requirements focus on the dangerousness of
the underlying act. Several states, by statute4' or case law, require an
inherently dangerous death-producing act before allowing application
of the felony murder doctrine. In Powers v. Commonwealth, 43 for ex-
ample, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that the rule should apply
only when the underlying felonious act has a natural tendency to pro-
duce the unintended death.'" In People v. Pavlic,45 however, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court upheld a manslaughter conviction for a felony
murder when the defendant's underlying felonious act of selling moon-
shine whiskey to the deceased was neither inherently dangerous nor
malum in se. Other courts require a malum in se act.46 California
47
consummation, frustration or abandonment of attempt, are done in furtherance of felonious enter-
prise); People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930) (killing of escapee during prison break
is act done in furtherance of felonious enterprise); People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 419-20, 139
N.E. 558, 561 (1923) (defendant not guilty of felony murder when cofelon shot unintended victim
after defendant had abandoned joint plot). See generally Alderstein, supra note 27; Hitchler, The
Killer and His Victim in Felony Murder Cases, 53 DIcK. L. REv. 3, 6-11 (1948); Moessel, supra
note 16, at 458; Morris, supra note 4, at 59; Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
YALE L.J. 537, 542-43 (1934); Recent Developments, Criminal Law: Felony Murder Rule-Felon's
Responsibilityfor Death of Accomplice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1496 n.2 (1965); 9 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 368 (1977); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 3d 239 (1974).
42. IowA CODE ANN. § 707.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1-3 (West Supp. 1981); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon
Supp. 1980).
43. 110 Ky. 386, 414, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901) (Kentucky court limited felony murder rule
because all offenses punishable by confinement in penitentiary are felonies).
44. Accord Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d 146 (Del. 1968), afl'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (burglarizing
junkyard not inherently dangerous act); People v. Carter, 387 Mich. 397, 197 N.W.2d 57 (1972)
(abandoning car with man in open trunk not inherently dangerous); State v. Chambers, 524
S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (car theft inherently dangerous), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058
(1976); State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409 (1973) (discharging firearm into occupied
property inherently dangerous); Wade v. State, 581 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (bringing
pistol into crowded bar inherently dangerous); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 309 A.2d
714 (1973) (injecting heroin into known addict not inherently dangerous); Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C.
308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973) (daytime breaking and entering and. larceny inherently dangerous),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974). See also People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414
P.2d 353 (1966) (en banc); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130
(1965) (en banc); People v. Golson, 32 I11 2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965); People v. Goldvarg, 346
I11. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972). See gener-
ally 1 BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 336 (9th ed. 1923). Adlerstein,supra note 27; Kenny,
supra note 23; Moessel, supra note 16; Moreland, .4 Re-Examination of the Law of Homicide in
1971: The Model Penal Code, 59 Ky. L.J. 788 (1971); Felony Murder Rule, supra note 27.
45. 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924).
46. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574,414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966); People
v. Salas, 538 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1975); Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d 146 (Del. 1968); State v. Williams,
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and New York48 courts also require an underlying felony completely
independent from the homicide to avoid double jeopardy
complications.49
The actor and victim limitations directly address the basic criminal
law principle that requires individual culpability before imposition of
liability. Certain states will not apply the felony murder rule unless a
felon or a cofelon commits the killing, 0 or the victim is a nonfelon.5 l
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, refused to impute mal-
ice from felonious acts unless the felon or accomplice was responsible
for the killing.52 By contrast, the California Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Sufperior Court 3 convicted a defendant of felony murder under a vica-
rious liability theory for a death caused by a policeman. 4
254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. App. 1971); State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979); State v. Wallace,
333 A.2d 72 (Me. 1975). See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 4.
47. See, e.g., People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539-540, 450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188,
198 (1969) (en banc).
48. See, e.g., People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927) (Cardozo, C.J.).
49. Thus, a court cannot try a defendant separately for the homicide and the underlying
felony. Furthermore, a court cannot try a defendant for felony murder when the underlying fel-
ony is the assault that caused the death. A court may not try a criminal defendant twice for the
same offense. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Accord State ex rel Glenn v. Klein, 184 So.2d 904 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (felony murder trial of defendant for death of accomplice during robbery
precludes trial for robbery); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972) (trial for
murder precludes trial for lesser included offenses of larceny and breaking and entering); State v.
Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 A. 416 (1919) (conviction for robbery precludes conviction for murder
committed during robbery). See generally Alderstein, supra note 27; Note, Assault Leading to
Homicide May be Used to Invoke Felony Murder Rule, 28 MERCER L. REV. 371 (1976); Comment,
Merger and the California Felony Murder Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 250 (1972); 7 U. BALT, L.
REV. 345 (1978).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501 to -1505 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, :31 (West
1974); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney
Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1979); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030 to .045 (Supp. 1981). See also People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d
777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965) (en banc).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 539-54c (1980);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1976); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030 to .045 (Supp. 1981).
52. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970) (no
first-degree felony murder if innocent bystander killed by policeman attempting to thwart rob-
bery); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (no first-degree felony murder
when cofelon killed by policeman in gun battle during armed robbery). See generally Adlerstein,
supra note 27; Hitchler, supra note 41; Moessel, supra note 17; Morris, supra note 41; Perkins,
supra note 41; Recent Developments, supra note 41.
53. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, (1970) (en banc) (innocent victim used as
shield killed by policeman).
54. For an example of another case using the vicarious liability theory, see People v. Conely,
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Restrictions regarding mental state actually negate the primary pur-
pose of the felony murder doctrine by preventing automatic imputation
of malice from the felony." Some jurisdictions require a separate
mens rea apart from the intent to commit the felony.56 Some states
differentiate statutory felony murder from common-law felony murder
by requiring a separate finding of malice,57 or by including this require-
ment in their statutory definitions of murder.5  In People v. Carter,9
the Michigan Supreme Court refused to hold that any killing commit-
ted during a felony is automatically murder because that would with-
draw the essential question of malice from the jury.
The growing number of limitations on the felony murder rule evi-
dence a gradual trend toward its abolition, as state courts and legisla-
tures seek to ameliorate its potential for unduly harsh results. Eleven
state legislatures have established affirmative defenses to statutory fel-
ony murder offenses, encompassing the act, actor, victim, underlying
felony, and state of mind limitations that courts have applied to the
rule.60 Seven states have downgraded felony murder offenses to sec-
ond- or third-degree murder, limiting application of the doctrine and
reducing punishment for convictions.6 Four states have now abol-
ished the crime altogether. Kentucky, Hawaii, and Ohio have abro-
48 Cal. App. 3d 805, 123 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1975) (death resulting from gun battle initiated by felon
and cofelons). See also Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (en banc); People v. Podolski,
332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
55. See supra note 49 and cases cited therein.
56. See. e.g., Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970); People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich. App.
226, 242 N.W.2d 465 (1976); State v. Millette, 112 N.H. 458, 299 A.2d 150 (1972); State v. Harri-
son, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 132 (1977).
57. See, e.g., State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1979); People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich.
App. 226, 242 N.W.2d 465 (1976).
58. See Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 298-99, 74 A.2d 125, 129 (1950) (fist fight);
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805, 807 (1939) (armed robbery); Commonwealth v.
Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 159 (1914) (rape). See generall W. CLARK AND W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 333 (1952); Moessel, supra note 16, at 458.
59. 387 Mich. 397, 422, 197 N.W.2d 57, 69 (1972).
60. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.15-010 to 11.40 (1978) (repealed 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501
to -1505 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54c
(1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 17A, § 9-203 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (West
Supp. 1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01
(1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115 (1979); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-32 to 18.33 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A32.030 to .045 (Supp. 1981).
61. See, ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.110 to .115 (1978) (repealed 1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30.1 (West 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN., §§ 609.185 to .195 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. § 7.18, § 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1973);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-J-203(l) (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.50(3)(b), 940.02(2) (West
1982).
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gated the rule by statute.62 In Michigan, where the common law
defines murder offenses, the Michigan Supreme Court eliminated the
rule in People v. Aaron.63 Until the Aaron decision, the Michigan
courts continually modified and diluted the rule in the same piecemeal
fashion as other states.6r The extensive limitations on the rule's appli-
62. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (1974); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 707-701 (1972); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Baldwin 1975).
63. 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
64. In People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1 (1858), the Michigan Supreme Court first enunciated Mich-
igan's definition of murder. "Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlaw-
fully kills any reasonable creature in being ... with malice ... aforethought, either express or
implied." Id. at 6.
Several early Michigan cases required proof of the common law elements of murder-malice
aforethought, premeditation and deliberation-for a first-degree murder conviction. See Wellar
v. People, 30 Mich. 13, 19 (1874) (intent must be equivalent in legal character to criminal purpose
aimed against life); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 217 (1862) (state of mind, not act, constitutes
offense); Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 149 (1860) (no malice aforethought when homicide occurs dur-
ing victim's attempts to resist felon's breaking and entering). See also People v. Younger, 380
Mich. 678, 681, 158 N.W.2d 493, 495 (1968); People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 306, 187
N.W.2d 434, 436 (1971). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, Revra note 35.
In Maher v. People, the court stated that the jury must determine the existence of malice from
an independent evaluation of the evidence. The Michigan courts, however, have sometimes held
that when the actor actually intends to inflict death or serious bodily injury, or when the natural
tendency of his behavior is to cause death or serious bodily harm, his actions may create an
inference of malice sufficient for first-degree murder. See generally People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich.
336,58 N.W. 328 (1894); Nye v. People, 35 Mich. 15 (1876); People v. Morrins, 31 Mich. App. 301,
187 N.W.2d 434 (1971); W. LAFAVE AND A. Scorr, supra note 35.
Under the Michigan murder statute, murders committed during certain enumerated felonies
constitute first-degree murder. The statute provides:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in waiting, or any other
kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary [larceny of any
kind, extortion or kidnapping] shall be murder of the first degree...
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Under Michigan statutory law, all other
murders are second degree. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Several early cases held that the statute merely raises the degree of certain murders, but does
not supply a statutory definition of murder. These cases rely on the definition of murder as stated
in People v. Potter, supra. See People v. Austin, 221 Mich. 635, 644, 192 N.W. 590, 593 (1923);
People v. Scott, 6 Mich. 287, 293 (1859); People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451, 457 (1850).
The Michigan courts have also modified the rule by placing additional requirements on the act,
actor, and state of mind elements of the offense. See generally Note, The Felony Murder Doctrine
in Michigan, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 69 (1978); supra notes 27-63 and accompanying text. One major
modification includes jury instructions on lesser included offenses in felony murder cases, thus
negating the implied malice aspect of the doctrine. See People v. Carter, 395 Mich. 434, 236
N.W.2d 500 (1975) (court upheld second degree murder conviction, but disapproved of court of
appeals holding that there were no lesser included offenses in first degree felony murder); People
v. Andrus, 331 Mich. 535, 50 N.W.2d 310 (1951) (manslaughter conviction allowed for death of
man that defendants had assaulted, bound, and robbed); People v. Treichel, 229 Mich. 303, 200
N.W. 950 (1924) (manslaughter conviction for defendants who bound and robbed old man but left
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cability led some Michigan courts to question the existence of the com-
mon-law felony murder rule in that state.6"
In People . Aaron"6 the Michigan Supreme Court found the com-
mon-law felony murder doctrine unnecessary67 and in violation of the
basic criminal law principle that requires individual culpability before
imposing criminal liability. Writing for the majority, Justice Fitzger-
ald began his analysis of the doctrine by tracing its development from
its early common-law origins" to its diluted modem form.7" Justice
notes instructing that he be untied); People v. Wimbush, 45 Mich. App. 42, 205 N.W.2d 890 (1973)
(proof of elements of murder required before felony murder conviction will stand). See, e.g.,
People v. Paul, 395 Mich. 444, 236 N.W.2d 486 (1975) (robbery); People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379,
236 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (reckless discharge of firearm); People v. Henry, 395 Mich. 367, 236
N.W.2d 489 (1975) (breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny). See also People v.
Jenkins, 395 Mich. 440, 442, 236 N.W.2d 503, 503 (1975).
In People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich. App. 226, 242 N.W.2d 465 (1976) in which a policeman was
killed while chasing car thief, for example, the court stated that a homicide committed during one
of the enumerated felonies, without independent proof of malice, is not murder, and an instruc-
tion on manslaughter is mandatory. The Michigan Supreme Court further modified the rule in
People v. Carter, 387 Mich. 397, 197 N.W.2d 57 (1972), by requiring that the killing be attributa-
ble to the accused.
For further reading on the development of the law of murder and felony murder in Michigan,
see generally Note, supra; Criminal Law, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 473, 504-11 (1977).
65. Several cases have held that the rule did exist in Michigan. See People v. Lovett, 85
Mich. App. 534, 272 N.W.2d 126 (1978) (rape); People v. Butts, 85 Mich. App. 435, 271 N.W.2d
265 (1978) (armed robbery); People v. Wilder, 82 Mich. App. 358, 266 N.W.2d 847 (1978) (armed
robbery); People v. Till, 80 Mich. App. 16, 263 N.W.2d 586 (1977) (robbery and forcible entry).
Several cases, however, held that the rule did not exist. People v. Hines, 88 Mich. App. 148, 276
N.W.2d 550 (1979) (conspiracy to commit armed robbery); People v. Smith, 87 Mich. App. 584,
274 N.W.2d 844 (1978) (robbery); People v. Dietrich, 87 Mich. App. 116, 139-40, 274 N.W.2d 472,
482 (1978) (robbery not conclusive as proof of malice aforethought); People v. Langston, 86 Mich.
App. 656, 659, 273 N.W.2d 99, 100 (1978) (robbery); People v. Hansma, 84 Mich. App. 138, 142-
43, 269 N.W.2d 504, 507 (1978) (attempted robbery); People v. Wilson, 84 Mich. App. 636, 638,
270 N.W.2d 473, 474 (1978) (robbery conviction upheld but lower court's instruction on implied
malice held incorrect); People v. Martin, 75 Mich. App. 6, 254 N.W.2d 628 (1977) (robbery); Peo-
ple v. Fountain, 71 Mich. App. 491, 499, 248 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1976) (robbery). See generally
Note, supra note 64.
66. 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
67. Id. at 728, 299 N.W.2d at 327.
68. Id. at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 317.
69. Id. at 689-98, 229 N.W.2d at 307-12. Justice Fitzgerald began his analysis with Sir Ed-
ward Coke's interpretation of Lord Dacres' Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535). See supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text. Next, Justice Fitzgerald discredited Lord Coke's statement of the
felony murder doctrine using Justices Stephens, Perkins, and Moreland to support his argument.
For a general discussion of the common-law felony murder rule, see supra notes 13-64 and accom-
panying text.
70. 409 Mich. at 669-713, 299 N.W.2d at 312-19. For further discussion of these cases, see
.supra notes 27-64 and accompanying text-
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Fitzgerald summarized the limitations applied to the felony murder
rule7' by contemporary American courts72 and concluded that at pres-
ent the felony murder rule does not resemble the traditional rule.73
This dissimilarity led the court to question the continued efficacy of the
rule. Although the rule did not broaden the definition of murder when
first developed, it has since had that effect on the offense.74 Justice
Fitzgerald criticized the doctrine's failure to incorporate a culpable
state of mind into murder offenses 7" and concluded that the rule was of
questionable origin and unnecessary.76
The court discussed the felony murder doctrine in Michigan, begin-
ning with the common-law definition of murder.77 Justice Fitzgerald
explained that Michigan's felony murder statute does not classify a
homicide committed during the perpetration of an enumerated felony
as murder. Instead, Michigan's statute classifies a common-law murder
committed during the perpetration of certain felonies as first-degree
murder.78  The court observed that the intent of a first-degree murder
71. 409 Mich. at 699-701, 299 N.W.2d at 312-13. The limitations are that the felonious act
must be dangerous to life, the homicide must be a natural and probable consequence of the feloni-
ous act, and the death must be proximately caused by the felonious act. Some courts require that
the killing be the result of an act done in furtherance of the felonious purpose. Some courts also
consider the identity of the victim and of the person causing the death. See supra notes 31-64 and
accompanying text.
72. See generally cases cited supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
73. 409 Mich. at 706-07, 299 N.W.2d at 316.
74. Id. at 706-07, 712, 299 N.W.2d at 316, 319.
75. Id. at 708-09, 299 N.W.2d at 316-17. Justice Fitzgerald stated that this problem is most
evident in cases in which a cofelon who took no part in the killing is held liable for felony murder
because he participated in the felonious enterprise. The justice also noted that another problem
may occur in states in which felony murder is a first-degree offense. In those states, an accidental
killing that occurs during a felony may result in a first-degree felony murder conviction; whereas,
an intentional killing that is not committed during a felony will result in a second-degree murder
conviction with a less severe punishment.
76. Id. at 689, 299 N.W.2d at 307.
77. The court adopted the definition of murder from People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 6 (1858).
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See 409 Mich. at 718-719, 299
N.W.2d at 322. Other states with statutes identical to Michigan's first-degree murder statute are in
agreement with the Aaron court's interpretation of the purpose for the statute.
Justice Ryan, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the fel-
ony murder rule. He stated that felony murder and actual murder are not at all similar, and that
malice is not required in felony murder cases. Id. at 727-28, 299 N.W.2d at 327 (Ryan, J., concur-
ring). The justice asserted that the major difference after abrogation of the rule will be that the
jury may not find malice solely from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The jury may
still consider the facts and circumstances of the homicide, including the nature of the felonious
act. Justice Fitzgerald believes that the rule is unnecessary in cases involving an inherently dan-
gerous felony because the required mental state can be established without invoking the doctrine.
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statute is to graduate punishment rather than to charge the accused
with murder for a death at the scene of a felony.7 9 The court therefore
concluded that Michigan had not codified the common-law felony
murder rule."0 The court stated that abrogation of the felony murder
rule would have little effect on subsequent cases because the rule had
been completely diluted and modified.8'
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v. Aaron to abol-
ish common-law felony murder is commendable. Harsh application of
the traditional rule is unjust and violates principles of individual crimi-
nal culpability. For example, the unfairness of the rule exists in states
in which felony murder is a first-degree offense.8 2 In those states, a
Id. He also concluded that if all the accomplices are acting intentionally, agency principles will
suffice to establish the cofelon's liability, rendering the doctrine useless. He further asserted that
using the felony murder docrine to hold a cofelon liable for his accomplice's killing is unjust and
violates the basic criminal law requirement of individual moral culpability. Justice Ryan asserted
that felony murder only requires "the commission or attempt to commit a felony, and a killing
causally connected with that commission or attempt." Id. at 741-43, 299 N.W.2d at 333. Justice
Williams, in a separate concurring opinion, concluded that the language of the statute itself proves
the necessity for a finding of malice in a felony murder case. According to Justice Williams, the
use of the word "murder" in the statute, in lieu of "killing" or "homicide," indicates that only
those homicides committed with the malice aforethought required to make the offense murder are
included in the statute. Id. at 746, 299 N.W.2d at 335 (Williams, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 717-21, 299 N.W.2d at 321-23. See also Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486,
494, 137 A.2d 472, 475-76 (1958). See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania
legislature amended the statute in 1974, but that modification does not affect the court's prior
nterpretations of the older version of the statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502 (Purdon Supp.
1973).
80. 409 Mich. at 719-20, 299 N.W.2d at 322.
81. 299 N.W.2d at 327. The court stated that the effect will be that the jury may not find
malice from the intent to commit the underlying felony alone. The jury may still consider the
facts and circumstances surrounding the homicide, including the nature of the felonious act. Jus-
tice Fitzgerald stated that the rule is unnecessary in cases involving an inherently dangerous fel-
ony because the required mental state can be established without invoking the doctrine. He also
concluded that in cases involving groups of cofelons, if all the accomplices are acting intention-
ally, then agency principles will suffice to establish liability; thereby rendering the felony murder
doctrine useless in those cases. He further asserted that in cases in which an innocent cofelon
would be held liable for a killing done by an accomplice, application of the felony murder doc-
trine is unjust and in violation of the basic principle of criminal law requiring individual moral
culpability.
82. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (Supp. 1980-81); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Deer-
mg Supp. 1980); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (Cum. Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04
(West Cum. Supp. 1981); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.2
(West Cum. Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, §§ 407-410 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.185-.195 (West Cum. Supp. 1981);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19 to -20 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Mo. REy. STAT. § 565.003 (Cum. Supp.
1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.010j to .030 (1979);
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first-degree felony murder conviction requires no proof of malice or
intent to kill even though a second-degree murder conviction requires
proof of intent. An individual who intentionally kills may therefore
receive a less severe punishment than an individual who accidentally
kills while committing a felony.83 In other degrees of murder, the pros-
ecution must establish the actor's mental state as an element of the of-
fense. To ignore that element in a charge as severe as first-degree
murder is unfair and illogical.84
Mandatory lesser included offense instructions partially alleviate the
punishment problem in applying the felony murder rule. If a homicide
committed during a felony is murder in some degree, then regardless of
the defendant's state of mind or the dangerousness of the underlying
felony, the court will ignore the fundamental principle of individual
culpability. Furthermore, if courts allow lesser included offense in-
structions or if the homicide is not automatically deemed first-degree
murder, the rule becomes unnecessary. If the defendant's felonious act
is inherently dangerous and manifests extreme indifference to the value
of human life, then the malice required for a murder conviction is pres-
ent. There is no need to impute malice automatically without consider-
ation of the surrounding circumstances and the defendant's state of
mind.85
By abolishing the felony murder rule, the Michigan Supreme Court
is, in effect, equalizing the treatment of felony killers and nonfelony
killers. If the jury finds all the necessary elements of murder present,
the court will convict the defendant of murder, regardless of his felon
or nonfelon status. If, however, the element of malice is absent, the
felony killer will rightfully be in the same position as the nonfelony
killer who commits a reckless homicide.
TheAaron court reached a just result. Abrogation of the felony mur-
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (Cum. Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32-030 (Cum.
Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-101 (Cum. Supp.
1981).
83. This problem is especially apparent in the cases in which a cofelon is held responsible for
an accidental death caused by one of his cofelons.
84. See Note, supra note 64.
85. The authors of the Model Penal Code found that in New Jersey, in 1975, only .41% of the
reported robberies and only .10% of the reported forcible rapes and burglaries resulted in deaths.
Based on these statistics, an automatic imputation of malice from the intent to commit such felo-
nies is both unnecessary and unfair. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment 6 at 38 n.2 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1980).
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der rule in Michigan, in light of its numerous limitations, will have a de
minimus effect on the administration of future cases. The Aaron
courCs decision will prevent the blanket application of an unfair disad-
vantage to a particular class of defendants. Furthermore, Aaron will
serve as persuasive authority for the courts and legislatures of other
states that are considering the abolition of the rule.
D.L.A.
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